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Promoting Fertilizer Use in Africa: 
Current Issues and Empirical Evidence from Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya 
 
Isaac Minde, T.S. Jayne, Eric Crawford, Joshua Ariga, and Jones Govereh 
 
Background and objectives of the report 
It is generally agreed that increasing agricultural productivity is critical to stimulating the rate 
of economic growth in Africa. There are many important and often complementary 
determinants of agricultural productivity. In this paper, we focus on fertilizer, without 
intending to imply that it is the only or most significant productivity determinants. Other key 
factors are seed technology, adequate water availability, labor, agronomic and other farmer 
management practices, and choice of crops to grow. 
Promoting the use of fertilizer and improved seed involves addressing the supply and demand 
constraints that keep usage rates low, especially among smallholder farmers. Such inputs 
must be available, affordable, and profitable—for suppliers and farmers alike—without 
creating untenable financial risks. Agricultural research, input market development, and 
direct promotion of input use through provision of credit and subsidized distribution are used 
to improve access to improved inputs and the incentive to use them. 
Recently, the role of input subsidies in stimulating growth and addressing food security and 
poverty alleviation objectives has re-emerged as an important agricultural policy debate. 
Sharp increases in world food and fertilizer prices in 2007 and 2008 have created a sense of 
urgency in meeting productivity and social welfare goals, and have put fertilizer promotion 
programs and fertilizer subsidies high on the list of options for government and donor 
responses to the crisis. 
The purpose of this paper is to synthesize experiences with recent fertilizer promotion 
approaches in Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya, involving both subsidized distribution and 
development of private sector input markets. The aim is to contribute empirically based 
insights about when to invest in fertilizer promotion programs, including those with a 
significant subsidy element, and about how best to design and implement them. As 
background before synthesizing experiences across the three countries, the report draws 
briefly from the extensive recent debate about the case for and against fertilizer subsidies and 
how to make them more effective.
1 We focus on four salient questions: 
  What are the guiding principles of a “smart” fertilizer subsidy program, and what 
determines its costs and benefits?  
  What has been the experience of Malawi and Zambia with fertilizer subsidy 
programs—their achievements and limitations—and what lessons can be drawn for 
the design of future subsidy programs that would contribute most effectively to 
national food security and smallholder productivity? 
  What can be learned from Kenya’s experience of rapid smallholder adoption of 
fertilizer without subsidies? 
  How do the sharply higher world food and fertilizer prices affect the justification for 
fertilizer subsidies in the region? 
                                                 
1 For example, see Crawford, Jayne, and Kelly (2006); World Bank (2007a), especially pp. 150-53 on 
developing efficient input markets, including Box 6.7, “Is there a rationale for fertilizer subsidies?”; World 
Bank (2007b); Morris et al. (2007); Minde and Ndlovu (2007a and b); and Salzburg (2008).  
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 “Smart” fertilizer subsidies 
What are “smart” fertilizer subsidy programs? 
Input subsidy programs may have various objectives, including to increase agricultural 
productivity, improve food security, or provide income support for poor farmers. National 
and household food security objectives may be especially urgent in times of crisis, such as the 
current environment of rapid and major increases in fertilizer and food grain prices. 
Regardless of their objectives, the design and implementation of input subsidies should be 
“smart” in the sense that (a) their benefits in terms of agricultural productivity and food 
security exceed what could be achieved by investing the resources in other areas;
2 and (b) 
they encourage farmers’ purchases of fertilizer on commercial terms, or at least do not 
impede it, which could result if government input subsidy programs crowd out commercial 
transactions or undermine investment in fertilizer distribution by suppliers and agro-dealers.  
Minde and Ndlovu (2007b) describe “smart” subsidies as those involving (S)pecific targeting 
to farmers who would not otherwise use purchased inputs (or to areas where added fertilizer 
can contribute most to yield improvement), (M)easurable impacts, (A)chievable goals, a 
(R)esults orientation, and a (T)imely duration of implementation, i.e., being time-bound or 
having a feasible exit strategy. Morris et al. (2007, 103-105) identify ten guiding principles 
for subsidies to be “market smart”:  
  Promote the factor or product as part of a wider strategy that includes complementary 
inputs and strengthening of markets 
  Favor market-based solutions that do not undermine incentives for private investment 
  Promote competition and cost reductions by reducing barriers to entry 
  Recognize that effective demand from farmers is critical for long-run sustainability 
  Insist on economic efficiency as the basis for fertilizer promotion efforts 
  Empower farmers to make the decisions about soil fertility management 
  Devise an exit strategy to limit the time period of public interventions 
  Pursue regional integration in order to benefit from the economies of market size 
  Emphasize sustainability as a goal when designing interventions, and, 
  Promote pro-poor growth, in recognition of the importance of equity considerations. 
While the concept of “smart” fertilizer subsidies is very appealing, they can be difficult to 
design. Also, unanticipated implementation problems can cause even well-designed programs 
to fall short of being “smart” in practice. To illustrate these points, and to identify lessons for 
future programs, we review below the experience with input subsidy programs in Malawi and 
Zambia.  
What factors determine the costs and benefits of fertilizer subsidies? 
The main cost factors are: 
1.  The cost of acquiring the fertilizer. World fertilizer prices have more than doubled over 
the past year and ocean freight and transport costs have also increased, reducing the 
potential returns to fertilizer subsidy programs. The subsidies needed to bring farm-gate 
                                                 
2 A corollary of (a) is that the public funds devoted to input subsidies should not be so great as to leave 
insufficient resources for public investments such as agricultural research and development, farmer training and 
extension, and physical infrastructure, which have been shown by Fan, Gulati, and Thorat (2007) to have 
relatively high direct payoffs for smallholder farmers and as well as increasing the payoffs to input subsidies 
(Jayne and Myers, 2007).  
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fertilizer prices down to levels considered affordable to low-income farmers will require 
greater outlays from national budgets than in prior years. 
2.  The full economic cost of implementing the fertilizer subsidy program. These costs 
include not only the economic costs of distributing and applying the fertilizer but also the 
opportunity costs of the resources used in the program, e.g., the flow of benefits that 
otherwise could have been achieved with the resources used for the subsidy program.
3  
The main benefit factors are: 
3.  The price of output. World food grain prices have increased dramatically in the recent 
past. To the extent that these increases are transmitted to domestic prices, they will boost 
the potential returns to fertilizer subsidy programs. In an extreme case where needed grain 
could not be obtained from regional or world markets, the benefits of additional domestic 
food production generated from a subsidy program would include saved lives and 
malnutrition averted.  
4.  Agronomic response rates. The payoffs to fertilizer subsidy programs could be enhanced 
by improving the aggregate crop yield response rates to fertilizer application. This 
requires making complementary investments in training for farmers on agronomic 
practices, soil fertility and water management and efficient use of fertilizer, and investing 
in crop science to generate more fertilizer-responsive seeds.
4 Survey data commonly 
indicate that the contribution of fertilizer to food grain yields varies tremendously across 
farms even within the same villages. Simply bringing fertilizer response rates among the 
bottom half of the distribution up to the mean would contribute substantially to household 
and national food security (Nyoro et al., 2004).  
5.  The degree to which subsidized fertilizer adds to total fertilizer use, rather than crowding 
out or displacing commercial fertilizer sales. This concept may be best understood in a 
“with/without” framework. Assume, for example, that in the absence of a subsidy 
program a given farm would purchase 2 bags of fertilizer. If this farmer is allocated 4 
bags of subsidized fertilizer, then she may no longer purchase the 2 bags from the trader. 
In this case, the additional fertilizer use as a result of the program would be only 2 bags 
instead of 4, i.e., 50% not 100% of the amount supplied. The two bags that she would 
have purchased from the trader now remain in the trader’s inventory. This displacement 
of commercial sales will be low or zero if subsidized fertilizer is sold to households who 
otherwise would not have access to fertilizer or could not afford to buy it. Findings from 
Malawi and Zambia indicate that an additional kg of fertilizer distributed under the 
subsidy program adds only 0.5 to 0.8 kg to the amount of fertilizer used by farmers 
(implying a displacement rate of 20-50%), and that crowding out is lower when the 
subsidy is targeted to relatively poor households than when targeted to non-poor farmers 
(Dorward et al., 2008; Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2008; Weber, 2008). 
The displacement of commercial fertilizer sales remains important even under a targeted 
input voucher program involving the private sector.  It is possible that commercial 
fertilizer imports and sales to farmers may fall to near zero at the same time that private 
stockists are given fertilizer by the government to provide to farmers under the subsidy 
program.  Stockists’ financial situation can be “made whole” through such a program, but 
the overall contribution of the subsidy program to increased fertilizer use would still 
                                                 
3 This would include, for example, benefits lost by redirecting Ministry of Agriculture extension staff to manage 
the distribution of subsidized fertilizer rather than to work with farmers to improve crop cultivation practices. 
4 Research indicates that the highest crop yield response is obtained when improved seed, fertilizer and good 
agronomic practices are combined (Heinrich, 2004). In some areas, improved management practices may have 
greater impact on yields than fertilizer alone (Haggblade and Tembo, 2003).  
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remain a major issue. The point highlighted here concerns the extent to which a fertilizer 
subsidy program displaces commercial sales (and therefore the extent to which it adds to 
total fertilizer use), not whether the fertilizer subsidy program allows private traders to be 
compensated for the loss of commercial sales by becoming agents of the subsidy 
program.   
6.  Timely arrival and utilization of the fertilizer by farmers. Crop yields may fall if fertilizer 
is applied significantly later than the optimal time in the crop growth cycle. Yet late 
arrival of fertilizer is a common feature of fertilizer promotion programs. For example, a 
recent study of fertilizer transport subsidies in Tanzania (MOAFC, 2007) reported that 
fertilizer arrived late in almost all regions visited. Late arrival and application of fertilizer 
were noted in the 2006/07 input subsidy program in Malawi (described below and 
reported in Dorward et al., 2008), and described for Zambia in Xu (2008, p. 68).  
The benefits and costs of fertilizer promotion activities are influenced, potentially greatly, by 
these factors listed above.  Difficulties in controlling for these factors pose methodological 
challenges for impact evaluations of fertilizer promotion programs. However, many 
unobservable household and village characteristics can be controlled for using household 
panel survey data to derive important lessons from past experience with fertilizer subsidy 
programs. The remainder of this report summarizes insights from these and other studies.
5   
Experience with fertilizer subsidies in Malawi 
Malawian smallholder agriculture is characterized by large numbers of very poor farmers 
heavily dependent on low-input maize production on small land holdings that are very short 
of nitrogen. Maize production by these farmers is not normally sufficient to meet annual 
consumption needs, and they depend upon casual laboring and other income-earning 
opportunities to finance the purchase of the balance of their needs. Although Malawi is one of 
the poorest countries in the world, the nationally representative Integrated Household Survey 
2 (IHS-2) conducted by the National Statistical Office (Dorward et al., 2008) indicates that 
45% and 36% of smallholder farmers still purchased an average of 65 kg of fertilizer per 
household in 2002/3 and 2003/4. In those seasons, the Targeted Inputs Program distributed 
small packages of free fertilizer (a total of 35,000 metric tons (mt) and 22,000 mt, 
respectively compared to 179,000 mt distributed in the 2006/07 program
6). Households 
purchasing commercial fertilizer tended to be relatively better off.  Poorer households were 
less likely to purchase commercial fertilizer, though to date there remains little analysis to 
show whether unaffordability, lack of access, lack of profitability, or some combination, is 
the main constraint.  
Food insecurity problems facing Malawian farmers have remained severe in recent years with 
national food shortages due to poor production seasons and late and expensive government-
funded imports leading to large increases in the local market price of maize (Tschirley and 
Jayne, 2008). In this context, the government started implementing the Agricultural Input 
Support Programme (AISP) in the 2005/06 season with the stated objectives of improving 
smallholder productivity and food and cash crop production and reducing vulnerability to 
food insecurity and hunger. Other objectives were to promote food self sufficiency, 
development of private sector input markets (emphasized by donor agencies), and wider 
growth and development.  
                                                 
5 For more detailed household-level analysis, the reader is referred to Ariga et al. (2008); Dorward et al. (2008); 
Xu et al. (forthcoming); and Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2008).   
6 Approximately 175,000 mt distributed through the AISP and 4,000 mt through the Assets for Inputs program.  
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Malawi has recently received popular acclaim for its success in turning the country into a 
food surplus maize exporter (New York Times, 2007).
7 In 2005/06, the government re-
introduced a large-scale fertilizer subsidy program (see Dorward et al., 2008 for a detailed 
assessment).  Erratic rainfall in 2005/06 and the exclusion of the private input distribution 
system in this first year of implementation impeded the impact of the program in this first 
year.   
In the second year of the program (2006/7), there was an explicit attempt to involve the 
private sector in the fertilizer voucher program. Roughly 2 million seed and 3 million 
fertilizer coupons for distribution to targeted households were initially allocated to districts 
and areas within districts in proportion to maize and (for “tobacco fertilizers”) tobacco areas.
8  
Government issued tenders to private firms to import and distribute the subsidized fertilizer. 
Import tenders were issued to selected firms that supplied government (ADMARC and 
SFFRFM) warehouses and/or private sector distributors authorized to sell subsidized 
fertilizer. Contracts allowing private sector firms to redeem coupons at the retail level were 
awarded initially to four firms, and later expanded to six firms. The criteria for participation 
in the coupon redemption process were evidence of a well-established retail network and 
access to supplies. These criteria excluded participation by independent agro-dealers 
operating small shops as well as a number of major importers who did not have their own 
distribution networks. Coupons, each good for one 50-kg bag of fertilizer, were supposed to 
be allocated to targeted households (able farmers who would otherwise be unable to purchase 
inputs) by Village Development Committees at the rate of one NPK (23:21:0) and one urea 
coupon per household, and one D compound and one CAN coupon per recipient tobacco 
farmer. Seed coupons were also distributed, one per household, sufficient to cover the cost of 
2 kg of hybrid seed or 3 kg of open-pollinated variety (OPV) seed. The program was not 
designed to reach the poorest farm households, since it was felt that the 100 kg of fertilizer 
distributed per household was too much to be used effectively on the small land holdings 
typical of such households. In practice, allocation procedures varied widely between different 
areas, with some local authorities deciding to give only one coupon per household to a larger 
number of households. There were reports of substantial diversion of coupons in some areas, 
but few large-scale confirmed cases. Farmers were required to redeem fertilizer vouchers and 
pay MK950 (U.S. $6.50) per 50-kg bag, representing roughly 28% of the full cost, with 
government paying for the remaining 72% of the cost. A total of just under 175,000 metric 
tons (mt) of fertilizer and 4,500 mt of improved maize seed were distributed at a cost to 
government and donors of about US$91 million (Dorward et al., 2008).  
In this second year of the program, the combination of favorable weather and the distribution 
of improved maize seed and fertilizer through the subsidy program produced what was 
considered to be a record maize harvest in 2007.  The government issued an official maize 
production estimate of 3.4 million tons.  Domestic consumption requirements were believed 
to be in the range of 2.0 million tons, indicating a surplus of well over a million tons.   
In response to the reported surplus, the government issued tenders to private traders to supply 
450,000 tons for export to other countries in the region.  However, the private sector reported 
difficulties in sourcing this quantity of maize, and by late 2007 Malawi had only exported 
283,000 tons. The government then suspended further exports due to a rapid escalation in 
                                                 
7 President Bingu Wa Mutharika was recently awarded a United Nations (UN) Global Creative Leadership 
Award and also received the first Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Network (FANRPAN) food 
security policy leadership award for reviving the country’s fertilizer subsidy program. He also was honored at 
the 2008 African Green Revolution Conference in August 2008 for the country’s success in promoting food 
security.  
8 These 3 million fertilizer coupons were distributed over a total number of 2.48 million smallholder farm 
households according to the 2000 Census adjusted for population growth rates between 2000 and 2006. The 
Ministry of Agriculture, however, estimates the number of farm households at 3.2 million.   
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domestic market prices. Within several months after the harvest, maize prices reached near 
record highs, exceeded only in the major crisis year of 2001/2 and the drought year of 
2005/06 (Figure 1). By late 2007/early 2008, maize prices in Malawian markets were $100 to 
$150 per ton higher than in other regional markets. The 2007/08 season was also 
characterized by reports of localized maize shortages, rationing of maize by the marketing 
board ADMARC, and net maize imports of over 50,000 tons from neighboring countries, 
primarily Mozambique and Tanzania (Reuters, 2008; FEWSNet, 2008). These outcomes are 
difficult to reconcile with the official estimates of a record maize harvest of 3.4 million tons 
in 2007, which is now widely believed to be an overestimate.  
  
Figure 1. Retail prices of maize in Malawian markets, January 1999 to May 2008, in 










































Sources:  SAFEX, Malawi Food Security Updates, FEWSNet. Kwacha/USD exchange rates from National 
Statistical Office bulletins.  
Dorward et al. (2008, 72-77) conducted an economic benefit-cost analysis of the AISP, taking 
into account a range of assumptions about grain-fertilizer response rates in the 2006/07 
production year (a year of abundant rainfall), displacement of commercial sales of fertilizer, 
contribution of improved maize seed to aggregate output, and maize price. The estimated 
benefit-cost ratios ranged from 0.76 to 1.36, and tended to be greater than 1.0 when the key 
variables were set at intermediate or more favorable levels. These results do not include the 
potential long-run growth impacts from higher 2006/07 incomes. 
The AISP did not seem to have had adverse impacts on government budget allocations to 
nonagricultural sectors such as infrastructure, education and health. However, the sizeable 
government budgetary cost of the AISP (roughly $80 million) did seem to have adversely 
affected delivery of other services by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, as 
evidenced by declining budget shares for research and extension (Dorward et al., 2008, 93).  
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The AISP evaluation identified a number of areas in which changes in program design or 
implementation would improve impacts:
9 (a) establish more comprehensive and consistent 
program objectives, e.g., to reconcile social protection versus productivity goals; (b) target 
subsidized inputs to the poorest 50% of small farmers, to reduce displacement of commercial 
sales and hence improve the aggregate impact of the program on maize production; (c) 
improve the monitoring of program impacts through strengthening the capacity of the 
national statistical agency to collect and analyze farm household survey data; (d) more 
effectively involve rural private retailers in the distribution of subsidized inputs (the small 
independent agro-dealers were largely excluded from the 2005/06 and 2006/07 programs and 
many of them had stopped selling fertilizer after the introduction of AISP, although the 
remaining dealers were incorporated into the 2007/08 program to a greater extent); (e) clearer 
and more timely procedures for AISP planning and implementation; and (f) better 
coordination of the AISP with other social safety net programs and policies, and with 
complementary agricultural development investments, such as research, extension, and roads. 
A number of these issues have been addressed through changes in the design of the 2007/08 
program. 
Experience with fertilizer subsidies in Zambia 
Insights from Zambia are based on various analyses carried out by the Food Security 
Research Project and collaborating partners, using information from nationally representative 
surveys of smallholder farms conducted annually by the government’s Central Statistical 
Office.  
Five Phases of Fertilizer Subsidies 
In the early 1990s, as part of economy-wide structural adjustment programs, the Zambian 
government initiated a process of fertilizer market reform that has evolved in five distinct 
phases. In the first phase, from 1991-93, the government appointed several state-affiliated 
banks and credit unions to distribute fertilizer on credit. Repayment rates were less than 5% 
during this period (Govereh et al., 2002). In the second phase, from 1994-96, the government 
appointed a few large private firms as Credit Managers (most importantly, Cavmont 
Merchant Bank Ltd. and SGS Ltd.) to import and deliver fertilizer on loan to “credit 
coordinators,” who were private retailers tasked with forwarding the fertilizer on credit to 
farmers. Cavmont and SGS did not take ownership of the fertilizer; rather they received 
management fees for their role of distributing fertilizer to designated credit coordinators on 
behalf of government. The designation of both credit managers and credit coordinators was 
made by government. The volume of fertilizer supplied through this system was determined 
by availability of donated fertilizer from donors and local production. In 1994/95 and 
1995/96, credit coordinators repaid Cavmont and SGS between 20-30% of the total loan 
value during this period, with evaluations concluding that many credit coordinators sold the 
fertilizer illegally instead of forwarding it to designated farmers on loan (Republic of Zambia, 
1996; Pletcher, 2000). Pletcher (2000) argues that because this government distribution 
system provided selected private agents with the potential for major financial gains and a 
protected market, they became co-opted into the government system and did not lobby for a 
more transparent open market system. Cavmont and SGS exited the market only when 
government insisted that they sign performance contracts requiring them to absorb some of 
the repayment losses being incurred by the system. 
The government responded by designating the state-run Food Reserve Agency to carry out 
the tasks of importing and distributing fertilizer to the agents. During this third phase, which 
lasted from 1996 until 1999, the FRA appointed private sector “agents” to distribute fertilizer 
                                                 
9 For more details, see Dorward et al. (2008, iv-vi).  
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to farmers and cooperatives on behalf of FRA. Ostensibly, the criteria for designating agents 
were related to past repayment history and collateral, but in practice the system was again 
vulnerable to political interference. Evaluations of the program again concluded that a large 
proportion of the in-kind credit, designed to help farmers afford fertilizer, was diverted before 
reaching them (Govereh et al., 2002). 
The fourth phase started in the 1999/00 crop season. Under pressure from donors to curtail 
the state’s distribution of fertilizer on credit, the government contracted several large private 
firms to import and distribute roughly 45,000 tons of fertilizer (approximately three-quarters 
of all fertilizer delivered to the smallholder sector) to designated cooperatives on credit. The 
private firms operated on a commission basis on behalf of FRA. In 2000, there were four 
main fertilizer importers and wholesalers in Zambia: Omnia, Sasol, Norsk Hydro, and 
Farmer’s Friend, with 85% of the volume concentrated in the hands of the two firms that the 
government chose to distribute fertilizer to selected cooperatives under its credit program. As 
with the private agents and credit coordinators before them, the selection of cooperatives to 
receive the fertilizer on credit lacked transparency and allegedly involved interference from 
state officials.
10  Evaluations indicated once again that a large proportion of fertilizer acquired 
on loan from FRA (through Omnia and Farmer’s Friend) was sold by implementing agents 
before it got to farmers (Govereh et al., 2002). Overall repayment rates rose to 43%. During 
the decade of the 1990s, encompassing these first four phases of relatively limited fertilizer 
subsidy programs in Zambia, national fertilizer use and maize production actually declined.  
The fifth and current phase of Zambia’s experience with fertilizer subsidies since 
liberalization in 1990 is marked by the Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP), which started in 
the 2002/03 season. The remainder of this section focuses on Zambia’s experience in 
promoting fertilizer use under the FSP. The volume of subsidies delivered under the FSP has 
been somewhat larger than during the first 4 phases, averaging 66,345 mt of fertilizer per 
year compared to 42,505 mt per year in the previous 8 years. Two factors have relieved the 
government’s budget constraints and made it easier for them to reinstate and self-finance 
their fertilizer promotion programs: the transition of the World Bank and other donors from 
conditionality agreements to direct budget support, and debt forgiveness under the HIPC 
program. Both of these recent developments have provided additional discretionary funds to 
scale-up the former fertilizer programs.  
Starting in 2002/03 under the FSP, the government has awarded tenders annually to private 
companies to import and deliver fertilizer to registered cooperatives and other delivery 
points, where it is subsequently allocated by the coops and agricultural extension workers to 
farmers. The intent of the program has changed over time, first being conceived as a way to 
support smallholders in remote areas where markets were believed not to function. Later, the 
program’s objectives evolved toward increasing maize production and marketed supplies. 
The FSP Program Manual establishes criteria for targeting farmers, one of them being 
possession of or access to at least 1-5 hectares of land and the capacity to produce maize on 
that area. Given that roughly 40 percent of the farms nationwide have less than one hectare of 
land, this criterion effectively excludes the poorest farmers from receiving subsidized 
fertilizer under the FSP (Weber, 2008).  
                                                 
10Politicians’ financial interest in the FRA fertilizer distribution surfaced publicly in a front page article in the 
country’s main newspaper, the Zambia Times (“Members of Parliament ‘Shrink’ Over FRA Debts Debate,” 
November 11, 2000).  
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Impacts of Subsidies 
In Zambia, for farmers in the small-scale category (0-20 ha of land), those with larger farms 
received more subsidized FSP fertilizer than those with smaller farms (Figure 2). Also, as 
found in Malawi (Dorward et al., 2008, p. 61), households that received subsidized fertilizer 
in Zambia tended on average to be larger in terms of land holdings and wealthier than 
households who did not receive subsidized fertilizer (Table 1). The government’s stated 
rationale for targeting the more capitalized farmers was that they would use fertilizer more 
efficiently than smaller farms and contribute more to national maize supplies.  
Figure 2. Percentage of small farmers who use fertilizer and who acquired subsidized 
fertilizer from the Zambian Fertilizer Support Programme, by farm size group, 2002/03 

























Table 1. Characteristics of households obtaining fertilizer from government subsidy 
programs vs. non-recipients, Zambia, 2003. 
 
  Households receiving fertilizer 
from government program 
Households not receiving 
fertilizer from government 
Share of total national sample (%)  13.9  86.1 
Total household income (‘000 kwacha per 
capita)  804 266 
Value of farm assets (‘000 kwacha per capita)  425  173 
Landholding size (hectares per capita)  0.23  0.15 
Distance from farm to district towns (km)  29.8  35.2 
Source:  Govereh et al. (2006) based on farm survey data from the Second Supplemental Survey, Government of 























However, providing subsidized inputs to relatively well-off farmers may be inconsistent with 
national policy objectives related to productivity as well as to poverty alleviation. For 
example, the study by MACO/CSO/FSRP (2008), based on CSO survey data for 2007/08, 
indicates that mean maize yield increases per ton of fertilizer applied are lowest for the 
largest farm size category (3.32 metric tons/hectare for farms between 5-20 hectares). The 
highest yield increase per ton of fertilizer was 5.33 mt/ha for farmers in the 1.7-5.0 hectare 
category, while farms under one hectare averaged 4.55 mt/ha. Based on this information 
alone (but see the footnote to Table 2 below), one might conclude that targeting fertilizer to 
farms in the range of 1.7 – 5.0 hectares would provide the greatest amount of additional 
maize per unit of subsidized fertilizer.  
 
Table 2. Fertilizer use and maize yields by farm size category, 2007/08 Crop Forecast 
Survey Data, Zambia.  
 
  Farm size category (hectares) 
  0 - 0.60  0.61 - 1.01  1.02 – 1.75  1.76 – 4.98  5.00 – 19.94 
Maize yield, unfertilized fields 
(mt/ha)  1.86 1.52  1.62  1.49  2.00 
Maize yield, fertilized fields 
(mt/ha)  3.18 2.66  2.63  2.61  2.63 
Difference in yield (fertilized 
vs. unfertilized fields) (mt/ha) 
a/ 
1.32 1.14  1.01  1.12  0.63 
Fertilizer used on maize field 
(mt/ha)  0.29 0.25  0.24  0.21  0.19 
Additional maize output per ton 
of fertilizer applied a/  4.55 4.56  4.21  5.33  3.32 
Source:  Central Statistical Office Crop Forecast Surveys, 2007/08 season, Zambia.  
a/ These estimates do not control for variables other than fertilizer, such as labor inputs or land quality, that may 
affect the difference in yield on fertilized vs. unfertilized fields. These average response rates are based on 
maize area harvested, not planted.  In 2007/08, over 25% of the maize fields planted nationwide were not 
harvested, mainly due to floods and lodging.  
 
Survey evidence also indicates that the crowding out of commercial fertilizer purchases by 
subsidized fertilizer is somewhat higher for large farms compared to small farms (Figure 3). 
Each dot in the graphs of Figure 3 represents a farm household surveyed by the CSO in both 
1999/00 and 2002/03. The slope of the line measures the change in a household’s commercial 
purchases of fertilizer per additional unit of fertilizer acquired from the government. In the 
case of the poorest tercile of farm households surveyed, the slope of the line is -0.34 while for 
the wealthiest tercile it was found to be -0.44. This means that each additional ton of 
subsidized fertilizer distributed to poor households contributes +0.66 tons of additional 
fertilizer use on their fields, while the incremental fertilizer use is only +0.56 tons among 
farms in the wealthiest tercile. Incremental fertilizer use observed for small farms is higher 
because they are generally poorer and less able to purchase fertilizer commercially. More 
than 80% of small farmers make no commercial purchases of fertilizer. For them, there is 
nothing to displace; all of the subsidized fertilizer they receive adds to their total fertilizer 
use.  Similar findings were obtained for Malawi using nationwide survey data from 3 
production seasons; mean incremental fertilizer use per unit of subsidized fertilizer acquired 
among the asset poor was +0.72 vs. +0.15 for the non-poor (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2008).  
This means that a fertilizer subsidy program will contribute more to national fertilizer use 
when a voucher is targeted to an asset-poor household than to a relatively non-poor 
household.   
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Figure 3. Changes in household acquisition of government-subsidized fertilizer 
compared to changes in purchases of commercial fertilizer, 2002/03 vs. 1999/00 
production years, Zambia.  
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Slope of line (-0.34)           Slope of line (-0.44) 
Note: These slope coefficients are accurate. The diagram for the wealthiest tercile (right side of Figure 3) has a 
much bigger Y-axis scale that has been collapsed to the same height as in the diagram for the poorest tercile. 
This makes the slope for the wealthiest tercile appear to be shallower than it actually is. 
 
After taking account of differences in maize yields per ton of fertilizer used, and the effect of 
displacement rates on incremental fertilizer use, the incremental maize output per ton of 
fertilizer used is the product of two terms:  (i) the maize-fertilizer response rate for farmer 
recipient i; and (ii) the extent to which an additional bag of fertilizer targeted to recipient i 
contributes to overall fertilizer use after accounting for potential crowding out.
11  This can be 
computed numerically as: 
(1)  ΔQmzi = (ΔQmzi / Δtotal fertilizer usei) * (ΔTotal fertilizer usei / Δ1bag subsidized 
fertilizeri )   
Both of the right-hand side terms in (1) are likely to differ for farmer groups ranked by 
landholding size and/or wealth.  On-going research from both Zambia and Malawi suggests 
that the first term is greatest among relatively small and poorer farms, because the second 
term (incremental fertilizer use from an increase in subsidized fertilizer distribution) is 
appreciably higher for the poor (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2008; Xu et al., 2008). These 
findings suggest that targeting relatively poor farm households seems to increase rather than 
decrease the contribution of fertilizer subsidies to national maize production.  
In addition to the objective of increasing national maize supplies, governments in the region 
are also concerned with ensuring household food security, achieving basic minimum 
nutritional standards, and improving equity. These objectives are also supported by targeting 
resources to the poorest rural households, since they run the greatest risk of being priced out 
of the market if they do not produce enough food for themselves. Well-targeted fertilizer 
subsidies therefore have the potential to help the rural poor feed themselves, rely less on 
markets for food, avert malnutrition, and promote equity in incomes in addition to increasing 
national grain production.  
Another issue is how much subsidized fertilizer is actually received by intended beneficiaries. 
Evidence from Zambia indicates that only 29% of the fertilizer intended for distribution 
under the Fertilizer Support Programme in 2007/08 was received directly by the intended 
                                                 
11 This specification assumes no interaction between fertilizer and other inputs as well as no differences in the 
use of other inputs between groups of farmers who received fertilizer and those who did not.  
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farmer beneficiaries. Official Ministry of Agriculture figures indicate that 50,000 tons of 
fertilizer were intended to be distributed under the Fertilizer Support Programme to 125,000 
smallholder farmers in the 2007/08 season. Yet results from the nationally representative 
2007/2008 CSO/MACO Crop Forecast Survey are much lower: only 14,706 tons of FSP-
subsidized fertilizer received by an estimated 56,271 farmers reporting FSP to be the 
principal source of fertilizer they used. This finding is consistent with widespread anecdotal 
reports, newspaper reports of statements by GRZ officials, and a Chipata District Farmer 
Association study (CDFA, 2008), indicating that a substantial amount of FSP fertilizer was 
sold illegally to traders who subsequently sold it at market prices to farmers. As an indication 
of the potential magnitude of this diversion of FSP fertilizer, the 2008 Crop Forecast Survey 
indicates that 259,717 smallholders (about 25% of the national total) received 59,366 tons of 
fertilizer from commercial sources (MACO/ACF/FSRP, 2008). These survey findings, when 
juxtaposed with official FSP distribution figures, suggest that a substantial portion of this 
“commercial” fertilizer purchased by farmers in 2007/08 was recycled FSP fertilizer.
12 If this 
is the case, then the primary beneficiaries of the subsidy were likely to have been those in 
charge of allocating the fertilizer. These observations illustrate the potential for wide 
differences between fertilizer subsidy programs in theory and in practice, and indicate that 
implementation procedures and the ability to control them are critical determinants of their 
actual impact.   
To the extent that the FSP fertilizer is nevertheless used on farmers’ fields, it still contributes 
to national maize production. This is an extremely important benefit especially at a time such 
as 2008 when the cost of maize importation is very high. Over the six years since the 
introduction of the FSP program in 2002/03, fertilizer use by smallholder farmers has 
increased by 12.5% (Figure 4).  Smallholder maize yields have also risen from 2.19 tons per 
hectare in 2002/03 to 2.51 tons/hectare in 2007/08 (MACO/CSO/FSRP, 2008), although 
abundant and relatively well-distributed rainfall in the 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08 seasons 
may also be an important factor in these trends.  
 
In summary, keeping food prices at tolerable levels through expanding local supply has 
important economic, social and political benefits. However, the experience of Zambia 
indicates that improvements in the pass-through of subsidized fertilizer to smallholder 
farmers and changes in targeting criteria and effectiveness would greatly increase the benefits 
of the FSP relative to its costs. 
 
                                                 
12 However, since the national survey does not include urban districts, we were not able to estimate the amount 
of FSP fertilizer received by urban farmers, even though FSP distribution plans indicate that they did distribute a 
portion of their supplies to urban cooperatives.   
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Figure 4. Percentage of smallholder farm households using fertilizer, 2000/01 to 
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          Source:  Central Statistical Office, Crop Forecast Surveys, Zambia.  
 
The case of Kenya: fertilizer adoption without subsidies 
Findings from Kenya are drawn from an Egerton Unversity/Tegemeo Institute report on 
trends and patterns in fertilizer use since the initiation of input market liberalization in 1990 
(Ariga, Jayne, Nyoro, 2007; Ariga, Jayne, Nyoro, 2008). This study tracks trends in fertilizer 
use for a nationwide sample of 1,260 small-scale farm households in 22 districts surveyed by 
Egerton University’s Tegemeo Institute in 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2007.
13 
Kenya liberalized its fertilizer market and phased out all fertilizer subsidy programs in the 
early 1990s. Total fertilizer consumption has risen from a mean of roughly 180,000 tons per 
year during the 1980s, to 250,000 tons per year during the early 1990s, to 325,000 tons in the 
2000-2003 period, to over 400,000 tons in the 2004/05 and 2005/06 seasons. In the most 
recent year for which data is available, 2007, Kenyan farmers consumed 451,219 metric tons 
of fertilizer. Anecdotal reports indicate that at most 300,000 tons of fertilizer has been 
consumed so far in 2008 due to both civil disruption and the escalating cost of fertilizer in 
world markets.  
The nationwide study of 1,260 smallholder households surveyed four times between 1995/96 
and 2006/07 by Egerton University’s Tegemeo Institute shows that fertilizer use per cropped 
hectare has risen by 39% over this 11-year period. The evidence suggests that growth in 
fertilizer consumption is occurring on smallholder farms; it is not driven by large-scale or 
estate-sector agriculture. The proportion of small farmers using fertilizer has increased 
steadily from 56% in 1995/96 to 70% in 2006/07 (Table 3). These rates vary considerably 
throughout the country, ranging from less than 10% of households surveyed in the drier 
lowland areas to over 90% of small farmers in Central Province and the maize surplus areas 
of Western Kenya. Interestingly, mean fertilizer use per hectare is virtually constant across 
farm size (hectares cropped), suggesting that even small and poor farmers are gaining access 
to fertilizer, and additional maize output per ton of fertilizer applied is higher for farms with 
under 2 ha cultivated than for those in the 2-40 ha range (Table 4; see footnote a/). When 
stratifying the nationwide sample according to wealth, the proportion of the poorest 25% of 
the farm households using fertilizer in high-potential areas increased from 67% in 1995/96 to 
90% in 2006/07. Among the poorest 25% of farm households in semi-arid areas, the 
                                                 
13 The Tegemeo survey is not strictly nationally representative but was designed to be proportionately 
representative within the main agricultural zones in Kenya.  See Ariga et al. (2008) for details.      
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proportion using fertilizer increased from 3% to 17%. Fertilizer use remains limited in the 
drier regions because of low profitability.  
These finding underscore the inferences made by Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2007) in their 
randomized evaluation of fertilizer usage in Busia District of Western Kenya, and by 
Marenya and Barrett (2008), both of which indicate that the fertilizer use recommendations of 
the Government’s extension service are unprofitable for most farmers in many areas of the 
country.   
 
Table 3: Percent of Farm Households Using Fertilizer on Maize 
Agro-regional  zone  1996 1997 2000 2004 2007 
  % of households using fertilizer on maize 
Coastal  Lowlands  0 0 3 4  14 
Eastern  Lowlands  21 27 25 47 43 
Western  Lowlands  2 1 5 5  13 
Western  Transitional  39 41 70 71 81 
High  Potential  Maize  Zone 85 84 90 87 91 
Western  Highlands  81 75 91 91 95 
Central  Highlands  88 90 90 91 93 
Marginal  Rain  Shadow  6  6  12 11 16 
Total  Sample  56 58 64 66 70 
Source:  Ariga et al. (2008), based on Tegemeo Institute/Egerton University household surveys, 
1997, 2000, 2004, and 2007. 
 
7.   
Table 4. Fertilizer use and maize yields by farm size (hectares cropped) category, 
Kenya.  
 
  (hectares cropped, average of four seasons) 
 0.16-0.81  0.85-1.30  1.30-1.78  1.78-2.51  2.55-39.11 
Maize yield, unfertilized fields 
(mt/ha) 0.66  0.73  0.67  0.79  0.71 
Maize yield, fertilized fields (mt/ha)  1.18  1.10  1.12  1.07  1.15 
Difference in yield (fertilized vs. 
unfertilized fields) (mt/ha) a/  0.52  0.37  0.44  0.28  0.44 
Fertilizer used on maize field 
(mt/ha) 0.12  0.12  0.12  0.14  0.15 
Additional maize output per ton of 
fertilizer applied a/  4.23  3.15  3.60  2.00  2.97 
Source: Tegemeo Institute / MSU Household Panel Surveys for the 1996/97, 1999/00, 2003/04, and 2006/07 
cropping seasons. 
a/ These estimates do not control for variables other than fertilizer, such as labor inputs or land quality, that may 
affect the difference in yield on fertilized vs. unfertilized fields. 
 
 
Fertilizer consumption in Kenya grew both for food crops (mainly maize and domestic 
horticulture) and for export crops such as tea, sugarcane, and coffee. Fertilizer use per hectare 
of maize cultivated has increased dramatically in all but the semi-arid parts of the country. 
About 87% of small-scale farmers in the high-potential maize zones of Western Kenya now  
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use fertilizer on maize, with dose rates of roughly 163 kg per hectare, higher than mean levels 
obtained in South and East Asia. 
 
Three main factors account for the expanded use of fertilizer by small farmers in Kenya. 
First, the Government of Kenya has pursued a relatively stable fertilizer marketing policy 
since 1990. After the elimination of retail price controls, import licensing quotas, foreign 
exchange controls, and the phase-out of external fertilizer donation programs that disrupted 
commercial operations, Kenya has witnessed rapid investment in private fertilizer distribution 
networks, with over 10 importers, 500 wholesalers and 7,000 retailers now operating in the 
country. 
Secondly, because of the increasingly dense network of fertilizer retailers operating in rural 
areas, the mean distance of small farmers to the nearest fertilizer retailer declined 
progressively from 8.4 km to 3.9 km between 1997 and 2007. This has greatly expanded 
small farmers’ access to fertilizer, reduced transport and transaction costs, and increased the 
profitability of using fertilizer. 
The third factor is intense competition in importing and wholesaling, creating pressure to cut 
costs and innovate in logistics. As a result, over the past 10 years fertilizer transport and 
marketing costs from Mombasa to Western Kenya have declined by nearly 45%, from $245 
to $140 per ton, allowing farm-gate fertilizer prices to remain roughly constant despite rising 
world prices (Figure 5).  
Interviews of key informants in Kenya’s fertilizer sector identified four factors responsible 
for the declining fertilizer marketing costs observed in Kenya: (i) exploiting the potential for 
cheaper backhaul transportation, taking greater advantage of trucks transporting cargo from 
Rwanda and Congo to the port of Mombasa; (ii) private importers are increasingly using 
international connections to source credit at lower interest and financing costs than are 
available in the domestic economy; (iii) mergers between local and international firms in 
which knowledge and economies of scale enable cost savings in local distribution; and (iv) 
increased competition among local importers and wholesalers given the expansion in the 
number of firms engaged in fertilizer marketing since the early 1990s.  
Regarding credit, many Kenyan farmers have been able to finance fertilizer through the credit 
offered in the integrated input-output chains for crops such as tea, sugar, and coffee. These 
integrated marketing arrangements have also provided the means for farmers to obtain 
fertilizer for their food crops, since the companies can recoup their loans for other crops as 
well when the farmers sell their cash crop back to the company. But in areas where fertilizer 
use on a particular crop is profitable, such as maize in Western Kenya and horticulture 




Figure 5. Price of DAP (Di-Ammonium Phosphate) in Mombasa and Nakuru (constant 2007 













































Note:  Nakuru is a maize-producing area in the Rift Valley of Kenya, 400 miles (645 km) by road west of the 
port of Mombasa. Source: Ministry of Agriculture. FMB weekly fertilizer reports for CIF Mombasa.  
 
The experience of Kenya shows how a stable policy environment can foster an impressive 
private sector response that supports smallholder agricultural productivity and poverty 
alleviation. These goals remain elusive in countries lacking a sustained commitment to the 
development of viable commercial input delivery systems. Output price stability has also 
facilitated the impressive growth in fertilizer use in Kenya. The operations of the National 
Cereals and Produce Board since the early 1990s, and the elimination of regional trade 
barriers since the inception of the East African Commission Custom Union in January 2005, 
have both promoted maize price stability (Jayne, Myers, Nyoro, 2008; Chapoto and Jayne, 
2007). Complementary programs to support small farmer productivity, such as the Farm 
Input Promotions (FIPS) program, the CNFA agro-dealer training and credit program, and the 
organization of farmers into groups to facilitate their access to extension and credit services 
under the Kenya Market Development Programme, have also been important factors in 
raising fertilizer use in Kenya. 
Because mean household incomes are higher in Kenya compared with many other African 
countries, the impressive market-led growth in smallholder fertilizer use in Kenya may not be 
easily transferable to areas where effective demand is highly constrained. And the Kenya 
success story is fragile. Sustaining its momentum will depend on commitment to supportive 
public investment and policy choices. Governance problems and civil disruption would 
jeopardize the sustainability of the commercially driven input distribution system and rural 
development more generally. Continued access to input credit for small farmers in many parts 
of the country will require government commitment to limit the potential for politicization 
and interference in the management of the interlinked crop marketing systems for sugarcane, 
tea, and coffee, which have provided a means for farmers to acquire additional fertilizer on 
credit for use on food crops. Also, new investment is needed in Kenya’s eroded rail, road, and 
port infrastructure to maintain Kenya’s competitiveness. Lastly, effective systems to improve 
smallholders’ crop husbandry and management practices are needed to provide incentives for  
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continued expansion of fertilizer use and productivity growth in areas where fertilizer is only 
marginally profitable at present.  
Implications of sharply higher maize, fertilizer, and fuel prices 
Since the beginning of 2007, world prices of maize and fertilizer have increased dramatically. 
According to data from the World Bank (2008a), increases in quarterly average prices from 
January–March 2007 to July-September 2008 are $74 for maize (from $171 to $245), 
$810/ton for DAP (from $344 to $1,154), $447 for urea (from $298 to $745), and $59 for 
crude oil ($57 to $116.
14 
A recent IMF study has examined the macroeconomic impact of higher food and fuel prices 
(IMF, 2008). Results indicate sizeable negative balance of payments impacts, primarily from 
the fuel price increases (since fuel imports by low- and middle-income countries are at least 
twice as large as food imports). Price increases have also contributed to inflation and poverty 
(especially for the urban poor), but here food prices have a bigger impact than fuel prices.  
At the farm and national level, the presumption is that these price changes will have negative 
effects on the profitability and affordability of fertilizer use: they may lead to lower fertilizer 
application rates and hence yields; they may make fertilizer unaffordable for many farmers 
who previously bought fertilizer commercially and produced a marketed surplus; they may 
lead some farmers to switch land out of maize and into other crops; and they may further 
discourage fertilizer non-users from adopting fertilizer. The fear is that without support for 
maintaining fertilizer use levels, domestic maize output will decline, perhaps requiring 
governments to meet domestic consumption needs through very expensive imports. If 
sufficient maize imports cannot be mobilized, widespread hunger may result, with negative 
social and political consequences at the national (and international) level, particularly if 
hunger turns into famine. 
How have these recent world price increases affected prices in Eastern and Southern Africa, 
and what are their implications for incentives to use fertilizer?
15 For producers, rising maize 
and fertilizer prices have positive and negative effects on profitability, respectively. The net 
effect on profitability depends on location and other specific circumstances, and is unclear a 
priori. For export-oriented crops, fuel price increases raise the costs of imported inputs and 
transport to the border, thereby reducing profitability. For import substitutes, the net effect on 
profitability depends on the location of production relative to the market to which output is 
delivered. Rising maize and fuel costs will increase the import parity prices at major internal 
markets. For production zones close to these markets, the rise in import parity price may 
offset the increased cost of transport from the production zone to those markets. This may not 
be true for more distant production zones. 
Figure 6 presents trends in maize prices in regional markets in Eastern and Southern Africa, 
in nominal USD per ton. The 2001/02 and 2005/06 years were drought years exacerbated by 
poor coordination between the private and public sectors in mobilizing needed imports in 
some countries (Tschirley and Jayne, 2008). The high food prices in 2007/08, by contrast, are 
not due to major production shortfalls, although maize production in South Africa was 
relatively low in both 2005/06 and 2006/07. The continued turmoil in Zimbabwe may also be 
contributing to rising prices. 
                                                 
14 These world prices have fallen significantly as of October 2008, to $183 for maize, $970 for DAP, $406 for 
urea, and $73 for crude oil (World Bank, 2008a), but local prices within the Eastern and Southern Africa region 
remain high. World Bank price forecasts in nominal terms for 2009 are higher for maize ($210) and lower for 
DAP and urea ($500 and $350, respectively) (World Bank, 2008b). 
15 Implications for consumers and government budgets are also important, but are not the focus here.  
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Figure 6. Retail prices of maize in Southern African markets, January 1999 to May 







































The trend in prices changes somewhat when examining regional maize price trends in 
inflation-adjusted local currency units (Figure 7). Maize prices are rising in some countries in 
the region (Malawi), and falling in others (Zambia and Kenya). Real prices in Zambia and 
Kenya are falling mainly because of currency appreciation against the US dollar in recent 
years. Rising food prices denominated in USD are offset to a large extent when converted 
into local currency units and further offset when adjusted by the ratio of US GDP price index 
to local inflation rates. Note, however, that declining real maize prices do not necessarily 
imply improved affordability for consumers, since the decline is occurring in part because 
other commodity prices are rising more rapidly, which affects consumers’ real incomes and 
purchasing power.  If incomes have not risen as fast as food prices, consumers’ purchasing 
power has declined. To examine this it would be necessary to track food price trends against 
wage rates and nonfarm business income for both urban and rural households, yet even 
annual data on wage rates in the countries examined has proven difficult to obtain. 
 
 Figure 7. Maize prices in various markets of Eastern and Southern Africa, in local 









































































Sources:  Ministry of Agriculture market information systems in Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya, National 
Statistical Offices for CPI data.     
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Trends in the local maize-fertilizer price ratio are a third important indicator to examine in 
evaluating how recent grain and fertilizer price rises will affect the incentives to use fertilizer. 
There has been a dramatic rise in fertilizer prices since 2007, and this rise in fertilizer prices 
has been proportionately higher than the rise in food prices.  Figures 8, 9 and 10 present 
trends in maize-fertilizer price ratios over the 1994-2008 period for Kenya, Zambia and 
Malawi.  Maize-fertilizer price ratios in 2008 are at all-time lows in Kenya and Zambia.  In 
Malawi, the relatively high price of maize in 2008 has partially offset the impact of rising 
fertilizer prices, and the anticipated expansion of the fertilizer subsidy program for 2008/09 is 
also likely to stabilize fertilizer use in Malawi.  
 
































Notes:  Price ratio defined as wholesale market price per metric ton, Nakuru, divided by DAP, c.i.f. Nakuru per 
metric ton, in nominal shillings.  
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture Market Information Bureau, Nairobi.  
 
 






































Notes:  Price ratio defined as retail market price per metric ton, Lusaka, divided by Compound D, c.i.f. average 
of provincial centers per metric ton.  
Sources: Omnia data files and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives files for Compound D; CSO retail price 
data for maize prices.    
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Notes:  Price ratio defined as retail maize market price per kg, Lilongwe, divided by NPK (23:21:0 4s) c.i.f. 
Lilongwe per kg, in nominal kwacha.  
Sources: FEWSNet reports for maize prices; Ministry of Agriculture for fertilizer prices, Lilongwe.  
 
Relatively low maize-fertilizer price ratios in most of the rest of the region are likely to 
produce several unwelcome outcomes:  (a) less fertilizer used on maize and other crops in the 
coming cropping season; (b) lower maize yields and production, other factors constant; (c) 
continued upward pressure on maize prices, even in countries that so far have not 
experienced major price increases; and (d) a possible shift in area out of crops that require 
heavy fertilization for profitability and into crops that are profitable even at low or no 
fertilizer use (e.g., a partial shift into roots and tubers at the expense of maize in the mixed 
cassava/maize zones, and a shift out of fertilizer-intensive cash crops such as tobacco and 
tea).  
 
The impact of lower fertilizer use on maize production and marketed supplies will be most 
discernable in countries that make relatively intensive use of fertilizer such as Kenya and 
least discernable in countries where fertilizer use is negligible, such as Mozambique.
16  
However, high fertilizer prices will limit expansion of production through technology 
adoption. For that reason, the Mozambican government is considering a fertilizer subsidy 
program similar to Malawi’s starter pack program.  Countries gearing up for large-scale 
fertilizer subsidy programs in 2008, such as Malawi, may also not be greatly affected in the 
short run. However, the impact of Malawi’s subsidy program and the current ADMARC and 
NFRA operations associated with maize price stabilization are anticipated to impose massive 
fiscal costs on the treasury with potentially serious macroeconomic consequences that could 
indirectly affect livelihoods and food insecurity in 2009 and beyond.  
 
As important as fertilizer use is in increasing food production over time, many other factors 
are crucial as well.  Over the medium and longer run, smallholder productivity and food 
security outcomes in the region will also depend on investments in seed research and other 
forms of crop science; extension programs to improve farmer knowledge and management 
practices; initiatives to organize farmers into viable groups for accessing seasonal loans to 
finance crop input purchase, obtain support services (e.g., crop husbandry knowledge, 
conservation farming techniques and other viable agronomic practices, soil testing for fine-
tuning efficient fertilizer use recommendations), and achieve scale economies in crop 
                                                 
16 In 2007, 70 percent of smallholder farmers in Kenya used fertilizer while only 4 percent of farmers in 
Mozambique did.   
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marketing; and investments in physical infrastructure, e.g., roads, electrification, port 
development, etc. For empirical estimates of how infrastructure investments affect 
agricultural productivity, see Antle, (1983) and Binswanger, H., S. Khandker, M. 
Rosenzweig (1993). 
 
It is also important to stress that incentives to use fertilizer depend not only on the maize-
fertilizer price ratio but also on fertilizer application rates and the maize yield response to 
fertilizer. Without pretending to any definitive results that would support specific policy 
recommendations, several rough calculations can be used to illustrate this point, given the 
maize and fertilizer price increases cited at the beginning of this section.
17 
First, consider a farmer who currently applies fertilizer. Using a simple partial budget that 
assumes a fertilizer application rate of 100 kg/ha each for DAP and urea, a yield of 2 tons/ha, 
a maize price increase of $75/ton, and an average fertilizer price increase of $630/ton,
18 the 
change in value of output is 2 x $75 = $150 and the change in cost is 200/1000 x $630 = 
$126, for a net gain of $24. With these assumptions, the net gain is negative only if more than 
115 kg/ha each of DAP and urea are used, or if the fertilizer dose remains at 100 kg/ha each 
of DAP and urea and the yield falls to about 1.7 tons/ha. This illustrates the importance of the 
maize yield response to fertilizer, other things equal. 
Second, consider a farmer who does not currently apply fertilizer. Heisey (cited in Byerlee 
and Eicher, 1997) indicates that in Malawi 55 kg of nutrient per ha applied to local 
(unimproved) maize gives a 750 kg/ha increase in yield over unfertilized local maize. 
Valuing maize and fertilizer at the July-September 2008 quarterly average prices cited by the 
World Bank (2008a), the gain in value of maize is roughly $184 minus the cost of fertilizer 
applied of $163,
19 for a net gain of $21 per ha. As in the first illustration, this result depends 
heavily on the maize-fertilizer response rate. Also, note that while the net gain in this simple 
example is positive, it is substantially lower than the net gain ($74) that would be obtained at 
the prices prevailing in the January-March quarter of 2007. Moreover, the net gain of $21 per 
ha implies a value-cost ratio (VCR) of $184/163 = 1.13, which is well below the value of 2.0 
commonly used as a threshold for acceptability to farmers. 
Third, the benefit-cost analysis reported in Dorward et al. (2008) for the 2006/07 Malawi 
input subsidy program provides another way of estimating the impact of recent maize and 
fertilizer price increases. Increasing the maize price from $147.5/ton to $245/ton, raising the 
average cost of fertilizer by $630/ton, and holding constant other assumptions from Dorward 
et al., the benefit-cost ratios for the Malawi program decline only slightly, ranging from 0.72 
to 1.18, instead of from 0.76 to 1.25 (the range reported in Dorward et al. for the base maize 
price of $147.5).
20 Other noteworthy impacts of the fertilizer price increase in this example 
are that the cost of procuring the aggregate amount of subsidized fertilizer distributed 
(approximately 175,000 tons) would rise by $630/ton, increasing the budgetary outlay by 
$110.25 million. Also, if farmers were expected to make the same 28% co-payment, they 
                                                 
17 These examples do not include the effect of fuel price increases on within-country prices of maize and 
fertilizer. Also, using the October 2008 prices given in World Bank (2008a) would result in net losses rather 
than net gains in the first two illustrations discussed in the text. On the other hand, at the forecast nominal 2009 
prices (higher for maize, lower for fertilizer) cited in footnote 14 (World Bank, 2008b), the net gains in these 
two illustrations would be much higher. 
18 Average of $810 increase for DAP and $447 increase for urea, rounded up to $630. 
19 Using an average of DAP and urea prices ($1,154 + $745)/2 = $950 and a nitrogen nutrient content of 
fertilizer of 32% (average of 18% and 46%). 
20 This result is explained by (a) the positive effect of the maize price increase tending to offset the negative 
effect of fertilizer price increase, and (b) the fact that fertilizer costs make up only part of the total cost in the 
BCR denominator (54-56% of total costs given 2006/07 prices, and 70-74% given the World Bank’s 2008 
prices).  
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would need to pay 2,094 MK per bag rather than 950 MK per bag.
21 This illustrates the farm- 
and national-level financial costs associated with large fertilizer price increases. 
Lastly, even if fertilizer use on maize remains profitable, it may become less profitable than 
other crops for some farmers, inducing them to switch out of maize. For example, anecdotal 
reports from Zambia indicate that because of the major run-up in soybean prices, many 
commercial farmers are expecting to find it more profitable to apply fertilizer on that crop in 
the upcoming growing season. Maize producers may also apply less fertilizer than in previous 
years if supplies are rationed or otherwise constrained. 
While maize-fertilizer price ratios may not be abnormally low relative to long-run mean 
levels, this is not cause for complacency. Major gains can be achieved from efforts to reduce 
costs in the fertilizer distribution system to push down the cost to farmers. There is also a 
need for innovative farmer extension programs to assist farmers to use fertilizer more 
efficiently so that each kg used produces more output. Also, at least some smallholder 
farmers who have been buying fertilizer at commercial prices may cut back on the amount of 
fertilizer used per hectare rather than eliminating fertilizer use entirely. If this is true, the 
potential effect of high prices may not be a great as some predict. A lot depends on whether 
timely fertilizer stocks are available for sale. Also if a smallholder has access to cash to buy 
fertilizer, and has a very small area on which to plant maize, the cheapest way to get maize to 
eat may still be to pay even higher prices for fertilizer to avoid having to buy even more 
expensive maize from the market. Hence, potentially the most important consideration is to 
ensure that adequate fertilizer supplies are imported into each country in the region in a 




Conclusions and implications for policy 
The existence of acute poverty and hunger, exacerbated by soaring food and fertilizer prices, 
cries out for an immediate response. “Smart” fertilizer subsidy programs in Africa are 
attractive to many because they offer the potential to increase the food grain harvest and thus 
reduce hunger in the short run. Income gains transferred to farmers through the subsidy are 
expected to result in greater savings and investment in productive assets, contributing to 
longer-run growth. In addition, income transfers to farmers address the social and political 
objectives of poverty alleviation and improved equity. 
However, achieving these benefits depends greatly on how the programs are implemented. 
The contribution of fertilizer subsidy programs to reducing poverty and hunger would be 
higher if they could be designed and implemented so as to (a) target households with little 
ability to afford fertilizer; (b) target areas where applying fertilizer can actually increase total 
output; and (c) promote rather than undercutting the development of a commercial fertilizer 






                                                 
21 In fact, the co-payment was not increased in the 2007/08 Malawi program.  
25
Several caveats should be considered before implementing fertilizer subsidies:  
1.  Fertilizer subsidies may not be the best option for addressing the current crisis of high 
food and fertilizer prices. Significant increases in demand for fertilizer are likely to 
drive up prices further (Salzburg, 2008). Also, the supply response to increased 
fertilizer use is not assured, given weather and other maize production risks prevalent in 
most of eastern and southern Africa. Thus, implementing large-scale fertilizer subsidy 
programs will not guarantee an adequate harvest. Lastly, subsidies targeted to particular 
crops such as maize may reduce output of other food crops such as cassava (Zulu et al., 
2001), reducing the net food supply response. 
2.  Fertilizer subsidies may not be the best option for addressing the current crisis of high 
food and fertilizer prices. Significant increases in demand for fertilizer are likely to 
drive up prices further (Salzburg, 2008). Also, the supply response to increased 
fertilizer use is not assured, given weather and other maize production risks prevalent in 
most of eastern and southern Africa. Thus, implementing large-scale fertilizer subsidy 
programs will not guarantee an adequate harvest. Lastly, subsidies targeted to particular 
crops such as maize may reduce output of other food crops such as cassava (Zulu et al., 
2001), reducing the net food supply response. 
3.  As a tool for increasing overall agricultural productivity, especially for small, poor 
farmers, fertilizer subsidies have a questionable record. Long experience with input 
subsidy programs in Africa is not encouraging on several points:
22 (a) there is very little 
evidence from Africa that fertilizer subsidies have been a sustainable or cost-effective 
way to achieve agricultural productivity gains compared to other investments, (b) there 
are no examples of subsidy programs where the benefits were not disproportionately 
captured by larger and relatively better-off farmers, even when efforts were made to 
target subsidies to the poor,
23 and (c) there is little evidence that subsidies or other 
intensive fertilizer promotion programs have “kick-started” productivity growth among 




                                                 
22 Morris et al. (2007, 103) summarize by saying: “the weight of empirical evidence now show(s) that fertilizer 
subsidies are likely to be inefficient, costly, and fiscally unsustainable.” 
23 The logical response is to call for better targeting of future input subsidy programs. However, Dorward et al. 
(2008, section 7.2.3) includes an illuminating discussion of the practical difficulties involved in targeting 
subsidized fertilizers to poor households, including lack of information on who the poor households are, and 
unwillingness of some communities to exclude any households from receiving subsidized fertilizer. The 
daunting variety of difficulties described here makes it hard to be optimistic about the prospects for significantly 
improved targeting. 
24 For example, Malawi and Zambia have had almost continuous fertilizer subsidy programs each year for the 
past several decades even during the so-called liberalization process (e.g., see Dorward et al., 2008; Jayne et al., 
2002).  
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4.  As a tool for increasing overall agricultural productivity, especially for small, poor 
farmers, fertilizer subsidies have a questionable record. Long experience with input 
subsidy programs in Africa is not encouraging on several points:
25 (a) there is very little 
evidence from Africa that fertilizer subsidies have been a sustainable or cost-effective 
way to achieve agricultural productivity gains compared to other investments, (b) there 
are no examples of subsidy programs where the benefits were not disproportionately 
captured by larger and relatively better-off farmers, even when efforts were made to 
target subsidies to the poor,
26 and (c) there is little evidence that subsidies or other 
intensive fertilizer promotion programs have “kick-started” productivity growth among 
poor farmers in Africa enough to sustain high levels of input use once the programs 
end.
27 
5.  In the high potential areas of Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi, many if not most households 
use fertilizer regularly. In less stable production zones, low or no fertilizer use by many 
smallholders is explained not just by credit constraints that limit acquisition, but also by 
the risk of crop failure, with resulting financial losses and consumption shortfalls. The 
lack of insurance causes inefficiency in production choices (Dercon and Christiaensen, 
2007). Recent trials of weather-indexed insurance are a promising potential solution for 
the risk problem (World Bank, 2007a, p. 149). 
6.  Hence, a balance is needed between interventions to address short-term supply 
shortages and avoid widespread hunger vs. investments and policies to drive growth 
and lift poor households out of the poverty trap in which they are caught. Currently, the 
governments of Malawi and Zambia devote at least 60% of their agricultural budgets to 
input and crop marketing subsidies, leaving relatively little for the long-term 
investments required for sustainable reductions in poverty and hunger. 
If the decision is made to implement input subsidies, the experiences of Zambia and Malawi 
provide several practical guidelines for how to maximize their effectiveness in meeting 
important national objectives other than economic growth, such as improved national food 
security, alleviation of poverty and hunger: 
1.  Use input vouchers that can be redeemed at local retail stores rather than direct 
distribution in order to maintain or improve the capacity of the private sector input 
delivery system. 
 
                                                 
25 Morris et al. (2007, 103) summarize by saying: “the weight of empirical evidence now show(s) that fertilizer 
subsidies are likely to be inefficient, costly, and fiscally unsustainable.” 
26 The logical response is to call for better targeting of future input subsidy programs. However, Dorward et al. 
(2008, section 7.2.3) includes an illuminating discussion of the practical difficulties involved in targeting 
subsidized fertilizers to poor households, including lack of information on who the poor households are, and 
unwillingness of some communities to exclude any households from receiving subsidized fertilizer. The 
daunting variety of difficulties described here makes it hard to be optimistic about the prospects for significantly 
improved targeting. 
27 For example, Malawi and Zambia have had almost continuous fertilizer subsidy programs each year for the 
past several decades even during the so-called liberalization process (e.g., see Dorward et al., 2008; Jayne et al., 
2002).  
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2.  Involve a wide range of fertilizer importers, wholesalers, and retailers in the input 
voucher scheme, even if it entails additional logistical costs. Providing tenders to only 
2-3 firms to import fertilizer can entrench their position in the market, cause other firms 
to cease making investments in the system or drop out altogether, leading to a more 
concentrated input marketing system and restricted competition when the input subsidy 
program comes to an end. A system that allows farmers to redeem coupons at the full 
range of existing independent agro-dealer retail stores will promote additional 
investment in remote rural areas where it is most needed. By contrast, failure to involve 
the small rural retailers may lead many of them to stop carrying fertilizer, as was the 
case in Malawi after the 2005/06 season, leading to erosion rather than development of 
a private retailing system. 
3.  Before deciding to target the input vouchers, carefully consider the objectives of the 
targeting and the practical feasibility and costs of implementing a targeted program, 
including personnel costs, time requirements and potential delays, leakage, and 
displacement of commercial sales by subsidized inputs. 
a.  If the objective is to increase total output, then the inputs need to reach farmers 
who can use them efficiently and on a large enough area to generate significant 
gains in total output. Evidence indicates that a high proportion of non-poor 
farmers are able to acquire fertilizer through markets so spending scarce 
government resources to provide them with discounted fertilizer will largely 
substitute subsidized fertilizer for commercial fertilizer, adding relatively little to 
overall fertilizer use or crop output. In some cases, small farmers may also use 
fertilizer more efficiently than larger farmers. 
b.  If the objective is to alleviate poverty, or to overcome liquidity constraints for 
poor farmers who would otherwise be unable to purchase fertilizer, then it must 
be possible to identify poor farmers, and socially acceptable to channel vouchers 
to them, at a reasonable cost including leakage. Assisting low-income households 
to acquire fertilizer especially in a high food price environment may make the 
difference between their ability to eat and going hungry. Providing crop 
production support to relatively asset-poor households also contributes 
importantly to equity and social protection objectives, 
c.  If effective targeting does not seem feasible or achievable at an acceptable cost, 
then a small universal voucher program would be worth considering. For 
example, a program designed to provide all farmers with inputs for 0.2 ha would 
primarily benefit small farmers while at the same time limiting the displacement 
of commercial purchases by larger higher-income farmers, some degree of which 
might occur anyway under a program that fails to target small farmers 
successfully.
28 
4.  Address infrastructure and input supply constraints as well as improving 
procurement efficiency (joint procurement arrangements and regional procurement 
hubs). This will help achieve the goal of enhancing farm-level fertilizer supplies at a 
lower price. Facilitating the movement of fertilizers across borders (removing customs 
duties and export taxes) will also contribute to overall improvements in supply 
efficiency. 
 
                                                 
28 The option of a small universal subsidy program is discussed in Imperial College et al. (2007). See also 
Chinsinga (2005) for a discussion of the earlier experience in Malawi with universal and targeted input subsidy 
programs.  
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5.  Facilitate private sector partnerships with farmers, such as through contract farming 
where conditions are suitable, would go a long way toward reducing the financial 
burden on government.  
6.  Strengthen farmers’ effective demand for fertilizer by making fertilizer use profitable 
and by building durable input markets and output markets that can absorb the increased 
output without gluts that depress producer prices. This involves two major 
commitments from government: 
a.  To increase farmers’ demand for fertilizer, governments should invest in rural 
infrastructure, efficient port facilities and standards of commerce to reduce the 
costs of distribution; fund agricultural research to produce seeds that respond to 
fertilizer; determine and disseminate fertilizer use recommendations that are 
appropriate for different areas (as opposed to one blanket recommendation for an 
entire country); and nurture the development of rural financial systems, market 
information systems, institutions for contract enforcement, and 
telecommunications to attract new investments by commodity marketing firms. 
These “public goods” investments, often considered outside the scope of fertilizer 
marketing policy, nevertheless strongly affect the demand for fertilizer and hence 
whether sustainable markets for fertilizer can arise. 
b.  To build durable input and output markets, governments should establish a 
supportive policy environment that attracts local and foreign direct investment. 
The case of Kenya shows how a stable policy environment has induced an 
impressive private sector response that has helped to make fertilizer accessible to 
most small farmers. Importantly, this has involved reforms to the financial market 
(elimination of foreign exchange controls) as well as to fertilizer and crop 
markets. In other countries, the implementation of large subsidy programs has 
inhibited the type of private investment response seen in Kenya, due to the risk of 
huge losses that subsidy programs inflict on commercial input dealers. 
7.  Increase fertilizer use efficiency by promoting farmers’ use of improved crop 
management practices such as crop rotation with legumes, changes in density and 
spacing patterns of seeds and placement of fertilizer and seeds at planting (FIPS Africa, 
2008), improved soil organic matter, early planting, timely weeding, applying fertilizer 
in response to rainfall (Snapp, Blackie, and Donovan, 2003; Blackie et al. 2006), water 
harvesting, and other conservation farming methods (Haggblade and Tembo, 2003).  
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